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ABSTRACT
Purpose: This paper examines the relation between firms’ political connections and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) reporting in Portugal. We argue that in settings where the existence of 
political connections are viewed as damaging collective interests of stakeholders, political 
connected firms can deal with legitimacy issues from such connections by resorting to CSR 
practices and the reporting thereof.
Methodology: Using archival data from a panel sample of 36 firms from Portugal between 2009 
and 2012, we examine the relation between political connections and CSR reporting by way of 
regression analysis.
Findings: We find a positive relation between political connections and CSR reporting.
Originality: This study draws on legitimacy theory to highlight that CSR can be used to deal with 
stakeholder activism and vigilance pertaining to suspicion related to the existence of political 
connections. 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility reporting, political connections, Portugal
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1. Introduction
This study examines whether politically connected companies are more likely to 
present higher levels of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting in Portugal. In 
particular, it examines the relation between the presence of politicians on firms’ boards of 
directors and their CSR reporting. 
The notion of corporate political connections (CPC) pertains to the establishment by 
firms of relationships to political power. They are many times seen as obscure relations 
between politicians and firms, in which both agents engage to obtain private gains. Bianchi 
and Viana (2014) refer to direct and indirect political connections. The former type pertains 
to cases in which a firm’s top executives or largest shareholders are or have been politicians, 
civil servants, members of parliament or close to political power (including though kin 
relationships with politicians). The latter type of corporate connections includes things such 
as lobbying activities, funding of political parties, politicians or political campaigns. Given 
that corporate political funding is not allowed by law in Portugal, our study focuses on the 
first type of CPC.
The concept of CSR depicts the imbricated character of business and society and deals 
especially (albeit not only) with responsibilities attributable to firms regarding the 
detrimental impacts of their activities on the society and the environment. It implies the 
consideration by firms of “the impact of their actions on stakeholders in society, while 
simultaneously contributing to global sustainability” (Sarkar and Searcy, 2016, p. 1433). 
CSR reporting has to do with the communication of information about companies’ 
engagement with CSR. This type of communication is usually undertaken in companies’ 
annual reports, websites, or in separate reports, and, besides financial information, involves 
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topics such as climate change abatement, employee relations, human rights, philanthropy, 
product liability, and corporate governance (Montecchia et al., 2016). 
There is a wealth of studies analysing how firms may benefit from political connections 
(Fisman, 2001; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Faccio, 2006, 2010; Faccio and 
Parsley, 2009; Claessens et al., 2008; Goldman et al. 2009, 2013; Boubakri et al., 2012; 
Correira, 2014; Gray et al., 2016). The case is not the same regarding the study of the relation 
between political connections and CSR or the reporting thereof. What is more, the vast 
majority of the existing studies on the relation between CPC and CSR and the reporting 
thereof focus on China (Marquis and Qian, 2014; Cheng et al., 2017; Li and Zhang, 2010; 
Gao, 2011; Gu et al., 2013; Li et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2015; Huang and Zhao, 2016). Only 
Rahman and Ismail (2016) escape this trend and study the relation between CSR reporting in 
Malaysia. The majority of these studies examine how CPC relate to corporate philanthropy 
(Li and Zhang, 2010; Gao, 2011; Gu et al., 2013; Li et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2015; Huang and 
Zhao, 2016). A few more recent studies explore the relation between CPC and CSR reporting 
(Marquis and Qian, 2014; Cheng et al., 2017; Muttakin et al., 2018; Rahman and Ismail, 
2016). 
Studies on CPC tend to focus on developing countries, where the benefits of political 
connections may be more substantial (Li et al., 2016). The vast majority of these studies focus 
on China, where “the government dominates the resource allocation and sets national macro-
control policies” (Li et al., 2016, p. 150). There is a relative wealth of studies on CPC 
including the USA in the sample used (Boubakri et al., 2012; Faccio, 2006, 2010) or focusing 
on this country (Goldman et al., 2009, 2013; Houston and Ferris, 2015). There are few studies 
on CPC and their value to firms on developed countries other than the US (Niessen and 
Ruenzi, 2009; Amore and Bennedsen, 2013; Gray et al., 2016). All the studies examining the 
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relation between CPC and CSR and the reporting thereof focus on developing countries: 
Malaysia in the case of Rahman and Ismail (2016), Bangladesh in the case of Muttakin et al. 
(2018), and China in the case of the remaining studies. As far as we are aware, our study is 
the first to explore this topic in a developed country setting, that of Portugal. 
Portugal presents a good setting in which to study the relation between firms’ political 
connections and their CSR communication. The presence of politicians and prominent 
political figures on corporate boards is a pervasive situation in listed companies. Costa et al. 
(2010), Louçã et al. (2014) and Mulcahy (2015) present evidence of a high degree of 
promiscuity between political and economic power in Portugal. Bianchi and Viana (2014) 
found that the majority of Portuguese listed companies have political connections and some 
politicians are connected to several companies. 53 percent of the Portuguese respondents to 
the Transparency International’s 2013 Global Corruption Barometer consider that their 
government is “run by a few big interests looking out for themselves” (Transparency 
International, 2013). European Commission’s Flash Eurobarometer 428, on Businesses’ 
Attitudes Towards Corruption in the EU, indicates that 66 percent of the Portuguese 
businesses surveyed consider that political connections are the only way to succeed in 
business (European Commission, 2015).
This study aims at contributing to the literature on the relation between CPC and CSR. 
Grounded on legitimacy theory, according to which CSR is seen as an instrument that can be 
used to achieve legitimacy, we expect that firms presenting higher levels of political 
connections are more likely to report on their engagement with CSR as a way of garnering 
support from stakeholders. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to prior 
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical background and hypothesis development. Section 
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4 presents the methodology used. Section 5 presents the main findings. Section 6 offers a 
discussion of results and some concluding remarks. 
2. Prior literature 
The literature exploring the relation between CPC and corporate transparency is scant 
and the evidence it provides on such relation is mixed (e.g., Chaney et al., 2011; Guedhami 
et al., 2014). Boubakri et al. (2012, p. 544) argue that given the predominantly political 
background (rather than professional) of politically connected executives, “their incentives 
tend to be driven by political considerations.” These authors offer as an illustration of their 
argument the evidence provided by Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), who found politically 
connected firms from Indonesia to be less likely to have publicly traded debt or equity 
securities abroad, which may be explained by the increased difficulty that owners may have 
in extract private benefits of control in the wake of the increased scrutiny and transparency 
resulting from cross-listing. 
Not many studies have examined how a firm’s corporate connections are related to its 
reporting practices. Some of these studies explore the case of financial reporting (Chaney et 
al., 2011; Batta et al., 2014; Guedhami et al., 2014; Harymawan and Nowland, 2016). Other 
studies explore how political connections are associated with non-financial reporting (Cheng 
et al., 2017; Rahman and Ismail, 2016; Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017). We focus on 
the latter type of studies in view of their relevance to our study of the relation between CPC 
and CSR reporting.
Chen et al. (2017, p. 96) argue that: “(a) firms that enjoy political patronage are less 
likely to provide informative disclosures, given the high costs (relative to benefits) of 
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disclosure; (b) loss of political patronage in a highly publicized scandal forces them to 
increase their disclosures to avoid the increased risk and costs of public scrutiny or 
political/regulatory sanctions.” Using a sample of 65 Shanghai-listed companies involved in 
the Shanghai Pension corruption scandal, which they considered as “politically connected 
firms”, they analysed whether their two basic arguments would hold. Their findings suggest 
that connected firms presented lower levels of disclosure than those of benchmark firms prior 
to the scandal, and that they significantly increased their voluntary disclosures in the wake 
of the loss of their political patrons. Chen et al. (2017, p. 92) concluded that higher levels of 
voluntary disclosure after the scandal could be deemed as a response “to the heightened risk 
and potential costs of regulatory and public scrutiny in the wake of a major event involving 
high political and public sensitivity”. Their findings indicate a negative relation between 
political connections and voluntary disclosure. They interpret this findings as o the extent 
that politically connected firms are shielded from market discipline due to their undue 
advantages derived from political connectedness, and to the extent that such firms are not 
necessarily more efficient and may be more opaque, severing political ties and reinforcing 
market discipline can improve resource allocation, corporate transparency, and investor 
protection.” (pp. 115-116)
Al-Hadi et al. (2016) analysed the relation between the presence of ruling family 
members on corporate boards and market risk disclosures in the annual reports of listed 
financial firms from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Their findings revealed that 
the extent and quality of market risk disclosures are significantly lower for firms that are 
politically connected, that is, have in their boards ruling family members. 
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The vast majority of extant studies on the relation between CPC and CSR focus on 
China (Cheng et al., 2017; Li and Zhang, 2010; Gao, 2011; Gu et al., 2013; Li et al., 2015; 
Lin et al., 2015; Huang and Zhao, 2016). Only Rahman and Ismail (2016) escape this trend 
and study the relation between CSR reporting in Malaysia. The majority of these studies 
examine how CPC relate to corporate philanthropy (Li and Zhang, 2010; Gao, 2011; Gu et 
al., 2013; Li et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2015; Huang and Zhao, 2016). A few more recent studies 
explore the relation between CPC and CSR reporting (Cheng et al., 2017; Rahman and Ismail, 
2016). 
Using a sample of listed Chinese companies from heavily polluted industries Cheng et 
al. (2017) found that CPC are positively related with the quantity of environmental 
information disclosure, but not with its quality. Companies seem to choose to focus their 
environmental reporting on “soft” information (such as environmental governance policies, 
environmental objectives, and energy conservation initiatives), over “hard” information, 
which they avoid (such as negative pollutant emissions, pollution fines, and compensation 
information). 
Rahman and Ismail (2016) used a sample of 300 non-financial listed Malaysian firms 
for the year 2013, and found that no significant relation exists between CSR reporting and 
politicians on the board of directors. However, they have found that the other proxy for 
political connections they used, government ownership, was positively and significantly 
related with such reporting. 
Muttakin et al. (2018) used a sample of 936 firm-year observations pertaining to 
companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange from Bangladesh regarding the period 2005-
2013 to examine the voluntary CSR disclosures. Their results suggest that CPC are negatively 
associated with CSR disclosures.
Page 7 of 22 Journal of Financial Crime
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Crim
e
All these studies have been conducted in a developing country setting, where its 
characteristics and consequences, as well as the perceptions regarding it, are very specific, in 
particular in China. For example, in China the government is an important initiator, 
stakeholder, and audience of CSR (Zhang et al., 2016). The same is not the case in developed 
countries, where CPC are viewed with extreme suspicion. 
3. Theoretical framework and hypothesis
While acknowledging the “noteworthy proliferation of theoretical perspectives”, 
Montechia et al. (2016, p. 44) suggest that the quest for legitimation is “commonly embraced 
by scholars as the primary purpose that encourages and motivates companies to disclose” 
CSR information. It is thus not surprising that legitimacy theory is among the main theories 
used in CSR reporting research (Michelon et al., 2016). Legitimacy theory is based on the 
idea that to ensure that they continue to operate successfully organization must behave in a 
manner which is coherent with what is deemed as socially acceptable behaviour by society. 
Moreover, as stated by Montechia et al. (2016, p. 44), it “is grounded on the assumption that 
managers will adopt strategies to demonstrate that the organization is attempting to comply 
with society's expectations.”
Suchman (1995, p. 574) provided one of the most cited definitions of legitimacy: 
“legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions.” Suchman already underlined the importance of the disclosure of 
information to legitimacy management when acknowledging that it “rests heavily on 
communication” (Suchman, 1995, p. 586). Later legitimacy theory proponents emphasize 
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even more this aspect, and assert that the perspective put forward by legitimacy theory 
“highlights the strategic importance (and power) of corporate disclosures” (Deegan, 2002, p. 
296). 
Legitimacy theory proponents put forward the idea corporate disclosure of relevant 
information is triggered or at least strongly influenced by numerous economic, 
environmental, social and political factors, and it is an important tool in the legitimation of a 
company’s actions (Kent and Zunker, 2013). Corporate disclosure policies are considered to 
“represent a method for management to influence external perceptions about their company’s 
activities” (Kent and Zunker, 2013, p. 1077). 
According to such a lens of analysis, companies are supposed to undertake activities 
that are consistent with social values and to provide information to society’s members that 
such activities are in consonance with the values held by society. In cases where a company 
managers view the values implied by their company’s activities as nonconforming with those 
held as important by society, remedial actions on the part of the company are required 
(Deegan, 2002). To be effective, these actions “must be accompanied by disclosure” 
(Deegan, 2002, p. 296). 
Numerous studies that adopt legitimacy theory as theoretical framework examine how 
a company or companies operating in the same industry react to events that are considered 
as threats to their legitimacy through CSR reporting (Brown & Deegan, 1998; Cho, 2009; 
Coetzee & van Staden, 2011; Deegan, 2002; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et al., 2002; 
Milne & Patten, 2002; Noronha, Leung, & Lei, 2015; Patten, 1991; Patten, 1992; Vourvachis, 
Woodward, Woodward, & Patten, 2016; Watson, 2011). The overall conclusion is that 
companies change CSR reporting practices following major events that affect the company 
and the industry in which it operates. 
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Based on legitimacy theory, the argument in this study is that in contexts in which CPC 
are viewed with great suspicion the relation between CPC and CSR is positive. This argument 
relates CSR and the reporting thereof with the need for a company with political connections 
to show that in spite of having such connections it is a company that operates in accordance 
with society’s expectations. 
In view of the above, we hypothesize that politically connected companies disclose 
higher levels of CSR information than their counterparts. 
4. Methodology 
Our sample includes all non-financial firms listed on Euronext Lisbon between 2009 
and 2012. It only includes firms under the Portuguese law. Given their specificity and the 
fact that their reporting period does not match the calendar year as is the case regarding the 
other firms, football firms were excluded from the sample. The final sample consists of 144 
firm-year observations, regarding 36 firms. Table 3 includes information on the distribution 
of the companies by industry. 
To measure the dependent variable (CSR reporting), we used the total number of pages 
(Cowen et al., 1987; Deegan and Rankin, 1996) devoted to CSR information both in annual 
reports and in CSR/Sustainability reports. 
To measure CPC, the names of the Officials of General Meeting of Shareholders 
(GMS) and of the elements that compose the Board of Directors (BD) and the Supervisory 
Boards (SB) were hand collected using the firms’ annual corporate governance reports for 
the period 2009-2012. Moreover, given that corporate governance reports usually include, in 
attachment, the board members’ curricula, it was possible to identify some political 
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connections. Two other sources of information were consulted: (1) a list of Portuguese 
political governors of the last 36 years who held a management position in the largest firms1, 
developed by Costa el al. (2010); and (2) Google web search, where we have examined the 
political activity of each individual. Names that matched members of parliament or 
government were cross-checked using the official websites of Portuguese Government and 
Portuguese Parliament. In this study CPC is a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if at 
least one element of its management and supervisory bodies (Board of Directors and 
Supervisory Board) is a current or a former government member or a member of the 
parliament, and 0 otherwise. 
We also include several control variables to capture other factors that are likely to 
influence CSR reporting. To measure these variables, both financial and non-financial data 
were collected. The first type of data (profitability, market capitalization, and leverage) were 
gathered mainly from OSIRIS (Bureau van Dijk) database. The latter type of data (age, 
industrial affiliation, listing status, state-ownership, and foreign ownership) were hand-
collected and supplemented by information reported in the OSIRIS database. 
We used multiple linear regression to test the relationships between the dependent and 
the independent variables. The model used is as follows:
CPC PSI20 StOwn ForOwn + LogMktCap ROA𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑝 𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖  +  𝛽2𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑖  𝛽5𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑖  
Leverage Age Industry +  𝛽7𝑖  +  𝛽8𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑖
where:
CSRep Total number of pages devoted to CSR information
CPC Dummy variable which assumes the value 1 if the firm is a politically connected and 0 otherwise
StOwn Percentage of ordinary shares owned by state
ForOwn Percentage of ordinary shares owned by foreign investors.
MktCap Natural logarithm of market capitalization
1 This list is the result of a research that focused on ministers and secretaries of state from strategic sectors of 
the economy, finance, public works, employment and planning.
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ROA Ratio of operating income to total assets
Leverage Long term debt divided by total assets
Age Number of years since constitution
Industry Industry-type indicator variable
5.Results
5.1. Descriptive analysis
Descriptive statistics for the continuous and categorical variables are presented in Table 
1. Our independent variable (CSRep) has an average value of 28.69, which suggests a 
relatively low level of disclosure when compared to the maximum of 186. The mean value 
for the variables MktCap and ROA are, respectively, 12.04 and 3.78. The average value for 
the variable leverage is 26.18 and the mean value of the companies’ age is 40.94. Regarding 
StOwn and ForOwn, their mean values are, respectively, 4.27 and 17.83. 
In what concerns political connections, during the period 2009-2012 we have identified 
76 firm-year observations, pertaining to 29 companies with political connections. These 
firms have employed a former or current politician in at least one year. 48 firm-year 
observations (22 firms) are from the sector Industrials, and the sectors consumer goods and 
consumer services and 4 contribute each with 24 firm-year observations (6 firms each). 
Table 1 about here
Table 2 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for continuous independent variables. 
As shown in the table, the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables are not high, 
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meaning that multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem.2 The highest correlation 
coefficients regarding the variable CSRep pertain to its relations to the variables MktCap, 
ForOwn and ROA, albeit all below 0.4 (at p < .01). The relation between ForOwn and 
MktCap is little over 0.5 (at p < .01).
Table 2 about here
5.2. Regression analysis
Results of the regression analysis are provided in Table 3. The adjusted R2 suggests 
that approximately 26% of the variation in CSR reporting scores between the companies can 
be explained by the independent variables included in the regression model. 
Table 3 about here
Our findings provide support for the hypothesis developed above pertaining to the 
relation between CPC and CSR reporting. The estimated coefficient for the variable CPC is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.3 Besides CPC, the variables MktCap, 
ForOwn and Leverage are statistically significant at the 10% level. Relative to their 
2 As a rule-of-thumb, one may consider multicollinearity as harmful when it exceeds 0.8 (Gujarati, 
2004, p. 359).
3 We feel very comfortable in considering that this result as significant in view of the warnings 
regarding perils of strict adherence to particular thresholds (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016). 
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counterparts from companies from Telecommunications, present significantly lower levels 
of CSR reporting.
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This study examines the relation between firms’ political connections and their 
communication of information on the social responsibility practices in which they engage in 
a developed country setting. According to the widespread view of CPC as something 
detrimental to society, they can be viewed as having a negative relation to CSR in the sense 
of being a socially irresponsible practice that is associated with distortions of competition 
and of democratic representation. Notwithstanding, CPC are also likely to be positively 
associated to socially responsible practices. The argument adduced in this study in support 
of the expectation of a positive relation between CPC and CSR is based on legitimacy theory. 
In a developed country setting, in which the existence of political connections is mostly 
viewed as damaging collective interests of stakeholders, firms presenting high levels of 
political connections are expected to deal with stakeholder activism and vigilance by 
resorting to CSR practices and the reporting thereof. 
The managers of a company with political connections are likely to feel the need to 
show that in spite of having such connections it is a company that operates in accordance 
with society’s expectations, and this may be achieved through enhanced CSR reporting. 
Hence, our expectation was that politically connected companies would disclose higher 
levels of CSR information than their counterparts.
Results suggest that in Portugal companies with political connections are more likely 
to present higher levels of CSR reporting than their non-connected counterparts. They are 
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congruous with the arguments presented in support of the hypothesis developed regarding 
the relation between CPC and CSR reporting. Based on legitimacy theory, we suggested that 
politically connected firms would have to deal with significant reputation concerns that could 
be tantamount to legitimacy problems and CSR reporting could be seen as a strategy 
established to garner the support stakeholders and alleviate legitimacy threats. 
The results of the examination reported in this paper are in line with those of the 
studies that use legitimacy theory as a lens of analysis of the way in which legitimacy 
threatening events impact on the social exposure of an industry and lead to the usage of CSR 
communication to deal with it (Patten, 1992; Coetzee and van Staden, 2011; Watson, 2011; 
Noronha et al., 2015). They are also consistent with the findings of the plethora of empirical 
studies on CSR reporting that, grounded on legitimacy theory, report evidence that a 
company’s higher public visibility is positively related to CSR reporting (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; Cho, 2009; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan, 2002; Milne and Patten, 
2002; Patten, 1991). Companies with political connections do seem to disclose a more CSR 
information than their counterparts. 
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, by providing data on the 
relation between CSR reporting and CPC. Second, by analysing this relation grounded on 
legitimacy theory, which enabled us to develop a testable hypothesis regarding such relation. 
We extend legitimacy theory to the examination of a legitimacy concern that may by specific 
to a certain national or regional context. 
The more obvious limitations of our study include the small size of the sample and 
being a single country study, which precludes the examination of the possible contextual 
effects on the relation analysed. Future research may address these limitations. Possible 
extensions to this study include the use of a larger sample of Portuguese companies, and/or 
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the use of a cross-country sample. As far as we are aware, this is the first study examining 
the relation between CPC and CSR in developed countries. Future studies should extend the 
theoretical lens of analysis used in this study through the incorporation of insights about 
cultural factors influencing the relation between CPC and CSR using the extended framework 
on a cross-country study. In addition to the development of cross-country studies, which 
usually use relatively small national subsamples, it would be important to develop more in-
depth single-country studies. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: For continuous variables
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Dependent 
variable
CSRep 144 0.00 186.00 28.6944 48.52500
Lev 144 0.00 67.86 26.1833 14.73524
MktCap 144 5.80 16.22 12.0352 2.17551
ROA 144 -27.22 11.87 3.7798 5.11886
Age 144 2.00 220.00 40.9444 39.45783
StOwn 144 0.00 63.50 4.2706 11.16229
Independent 
variables
ForOwn 144 0.00 78.88 17.8273 20.52524
Panel B: For categorical variables
Variable Description N %
No 68 47.2%
Yes 76 52.8%
CPC
Total 144 100.0%
Consumer goods 24 16,7%
Industrials 48 33,3%
Basic materials 12 8,3%
Consumer services 24 16,7%
Technology 16 11,1%
Telecommunications 8 5,6%
Utilities & Oil and gas 12 8,3%
Industry
Total 144 100,0%
Table 2 – Pearson correlation matrix for the continuous variables 
 Tt Age MktCap Lev100 ROA StOwn ForOwn
CSRep 1 0.010 0.486** -0.033 .293** 0.058 0.313**
Age 0.010 1 0.026 -.205* -0.022 -0.082 -0.096
MktCap 0.486** -0.001 1 0.133 0.485** 0.230** 0.588**
Leverage -0.033 -.205* 0.127 1 -0.237** 0.261** -0.004
ROA 0.293** -0.022 0.479** -.237** 1 0.058 0.257**
StOwn 0.058 -0.082 0.223** .261** 0.058 1 0.020
ForOwn 0.313** -0.096 0.592** -0.004 0.257** 0.020 1
**. A Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level
Page 21 of 22 Journal of Financial Crime
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Crim
e
Table 3 – Regression results
 Variables B Sig.
Age -0.102 0.238
MktCap 0.244 0.058
Leverage -0.140 0.112
ROA 0.083 0.373
StOwn -0.002 0.996
ForOwn 0.192 0.097
CPC 0.175 0.051
Consumer goods 0.055 0.708
Industrials 0.006 0.971
Basic materials -0.113 0.290
Consumer services -0.212 0.155
Technology -0.178 0.189
Telecommunications -0.273 0.006
2009 0.027 0.773
2010 0.038 0.673
2011 0.017 0.849
Adj. R2 = 0.257;
Durbin-Watson = 2.372
F = 3.914; p = 0.000
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